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Abstract
Differential Privacy (DP) provides strong guarantees on the risk of compromising a users data
in statistical learning applications, though these strong protections make learning challenging
and may be too stringent for some use cases. To address this, we propose element level differential
privacy, which extends differential privacy to provide protection against leaking information
about any particular “element” a user has, allowing better utility and more robust results than
classical DP. By carefully choosing these “elements,” it is possible to provide privacy protections
at a desired granularity. We provide definitions, associated privacy guarantees, and analysis
to identify the tradeoffs with the new definition; we also develop several private estimation
and learning methodologies, providing careful examples for item frequency and M-estimation
(empirical risk minimization) with concomitant privacy and utility analysis. We complement
our theoretical and methodological advances with several real-world applications, estimating
histograms and fitting several large-scale prediction models, including deep networks.
1 Introduction
The substantial growth in data collection across many domains has led to commensurate attention
to and work on privacy risks in both academic [28, 25] and industrial settings [30, 3, 11]. Dwork,
McSherry, Nissim, and Smith’s differential privacy [28] and its variants [27, 12, 40, 18]—where
a randomized algorithm returns similar outputs for similar input samples—is now the standard
privacy methodology, as it gives provable protection against strong adversarial attacks on privacy.
Indeed, given the output of a differentially private analysis on a sample S = {X1, . . . , Xn}, it is
challenging to identify whether a particular individual x belongs to S even for an attacker knowing
the entire sample except for a single observation. These strong guarantees motivate work on private
data analyses, including in statistical estimation [46, 23], machine learning [14], game theory [39],
and networks and graphs [33, 34].
Yet developing private algorithms that achieve reasonable utility is challenging, as the strong
protections differential privacy provides necessarily degrade statistical utility. On the theoretical
side, the relative sample size necessary for private algorithms to achieve similar utility to that of
non-private algorithms grows with problem dimension and inversely with the privacy parameter
ε [8, 47, 23, 20]. On a practical level, this challenge may lead privacy applications to instantiate a
large privacy parameter ε to obtain acceptable statistical performance—for example, Abadi et al.
[1] remarkably are able to fit neural networks with differential privacy at all, though they require a
value of ε = 8 even for a weaker form of “event level” privacy to achieve performance approaching
non-private algorithms—but privacy guarantees for large values are unclear [25].
We argue that standard differential privacy’s strong protections are not always necessary to
provide sufficient protection for a system’s users. For example, an individual phone user sends
multiple text messages, or takes several cell-phone photos, each a single datum. In such cases,
it may be satisfying from a privacy perspective not to protect whether a user participates in
∗Part of this work performed while in a summer internship at Apple. Partially supported by the Office of Naval
Research award YIP N00014-19-2288.
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a dataset—versions of differential privacy protect against discovering this participation, though
whether one has a phone is likely not very sensitive—but to protect so that no one knows any
particular thing a user has done, e.g., whether the user has ever typed a given word or taken a
photo of a mountain. Concretely, consider estimating the frequency of different word use in email
messages. Differential privacy prevents an attacker from (accurately) distinguishing a user who
sends hundreds of emails daily from one who has never typed a word in his or her lifetime, a
protection that may be too strong. More nuanced tradeoffs can arise if we wish to prevent an
attacker from knowing, for example, whether a user has ever typed a given word.
To address these challenges, we propose element-level differential privacy, which aims to provide
protection for what we—at the risk of some hubristic excess—might term reasonable attacks. The
motivation for our definition is that in many statistical estimation and learning problems, an
individual may contribute many datapoints; in a problem of learning from mobile devices, a typical
cell-phone contains many individual photos and hundreds of distinct text messages, for example, and
it is these data that are private. The key to differential privacy and its descendant definitions is the
notion of neighboring datasets [25] or samples, where privacy guarantees certify that an adversary
given the output of a private mechanism M cannot reliably distinguish between its applications M(x)
and M(x′) on neighboring samples x and x′. In differential privacy, two samples are neighboring if
they differ in at most a single observation. As Chatzikokolakis et al. [13] note, it is thus natural to
quantify a distance between users or samples x, x′ to redefine neighboring, and mechanisms then
provide privacy for nearby users under this distance [13, 2, 8].
Figure 1. Example histories of four different users’ text messages (each column represents a user’s
conversation). The left three columns reflect a conversation of the first author with his friends. The
rightmost is a conversation between the second and third authors. In the standard differential privacy
definition, each user is distance 1 from each other user. In contrast, element-level privacy (with the
histogram distance function described in the introduction) identifies the three left transcripts as
neighboring—at distance 2—irrespective of the number of times each uses the word yo or bro, while
the right conversation is distant.
Element-level privacy takes this idea and defines distances based on the elements, which we
describe in the sequel, that an individual user’s data x contains; here, two users are neighboring
if they differ in one or fewer elements. Consider estimating frequency of word use in text (SMS)
messages. Then a possible distance function between two users is the number of words that have
different counts per user, i.e., we represent each user as a vector x ∈ Nd of per-word counts (how
many times the user used each word in a dictionary of size d), and the distance between users is the
Hamming distance d(x, x′) =
∑d
j=1 1{xj 6= x′j} between their histograms (see Figure 1). Element-
level differential privacy then makes it challenging for an attacker to discover any particular word
a user utters. In Section 2.2 and throughout our applications, we present more concrete examples
to compare and contrast element-level and classical differential privacy.
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As we note above, there is substantial work on privacy broadly, with a line of work investigating
appropriate notions of distance and what distinctions between individuals and data should be
protected. We highlight a few works in this direction here. Andre´s et al. [2] develop distance-based
notions of privacy to release information to geo-location services, where privacy protections may
degrade with distance to a user (e.g., it is acceptable to release that a user is in Paris, but perhaps
not at 28 Rue Vieille du Temple). Kasiviswanathan et al. [33] discuss protecting privacy at the
level of node differences in graphs, where two graphs are neighboring if a single node is removed or
added to the graph (with arbitrarily many edges to other nodes), which is distinct from providing
privacy only on edge appearances. In the context of large-scale web or mobile applications, there are
differences between event-level privacy [29, 30, 1], which protects each individual action a user takes,
though a user contributing multiple data items (e.g. sending multiple text messages) suffers linear
degradation in privacy guarantees, and user-level privacy [38], where all users are neighboring, no
matter how many data contributions they make or how diverse their data. The former (event-level)
provides limited privacy guarantees, while the latter (user-level) may be too strong for practical use.
In this context, element-level privacy attempts to provide privacy at the right granularity for the
application at hand: in a way we formalize shortly, one identifies the elements to be protected, then
guarantees that no matter how much data corresponding to a particular element a user contributes,
the output of the privacy mechanism changes little.
In the remainder of the paper, we carefully define element-level differential privacy (Section 2),
using standard tools to show that it inherits many of the desiderata important for satisfactory
privacy definitions (composition, group privacy, privacy to post-processing, side-information re-
silience, and amplification by subsampling) in Section 2.3. As one of our major goals is to provide
practicable procedures for estimation and learning with privacy protections, we devote Section 3
to several methodological contributions. In particular, we demonstrate histogram estimators and
tools for estimation of frequent elements, highlighting the advantages element-level privacy can
provide, and we show how to apply element-level privacy to fit large scale machine learning models
and compute M-estimators (Section 3.3) using stochastic-gradient-type methods. Along the way,
we demonstrate a new asymptotic normality result for stochastic approximation procedures ap-
plied to fixed finite datasets, which may be of interest beyond privacy. We complement these with
experimental evidence on several real-world machine-learning tasks in Section 4.
2 Element-level privacy
As we allude in the introduction, our main goal in this paper is to provide a new definition of
privacy, simultaneously developing its properties while demonstrating new procedures that obey its
strictures. To that end, we begin by defining element-level privacy, contrasting it with prior notions.
The basic notion of privacy is Dwork et al.’s differential privacy (DP), while other definitions
of privacy, of which we recapitulate a few, include approximate differential privacy [27], Re´nyi
differential privacy [40] and concentrated differential privacy [26, 12], and f -differential privacy [18].
2.1 Privacy definitions
The key to each of these definitions of privacy is a distance on the space of samples. In particular,
let dsample : X n × X n → R+ be a distance on X n, and let M be a randomized mapping from
X n to some (measurable) space Z. In standard differential privacy, this distance is the (order-
invariant) Hamming metric: letting Πn be the collection of all permutations of n elements, for
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samples S = (x1, . . . , xn), S
′ = (x′1, . . . , x′n) ∈ X n we have
dsample(S, S
′) = dHamming(S, S′) := min
pi∈Πn
n∑
i=1
1{xi 6= x′pi(i)}.
As Chatzikokolakis et al. [13] note, focusing on the case of differential privacy, we may take any
distance on the samples to provide analogues of differential privacy; such alternative distances are
important, for example, for graph-based notions of differential privacy [33], location services [2], or
event-level streams [29, 30].
We thus make the following definitions, which generalize those in prior work by treating distance
between two samples as a first-class object.
Definition 2.1 (Dwork et al. [28, 27]). Let ε, δ ≥ 0. The randomized mechanism M : X n → Z is
(ε, δ)-differentially private for the distance dsample if for any pair of samples S, S
′ with dsample(S, S′) ≤
1 and any measurable subset A ⊂ Z,
P(M(S) ∈ A) ≤ eεP(M(S′) ∈ A) + δ,
where the probability is taken over only the randomness in M (treating S, S′ as fixed).
We can abstract away from other definitions of privacy as well.
Definition 2.2 (Mironov [40]). Let ε ≥ 0, α ≥ 1. The mechanism M : X n → Z is (ε, α)-Re´nyi
differentially private for the distance dsample if for any pair of samples S, S
′ with dsample(S, S′) ≤ 1,
Dα
(
M(S)||M(S′)) ≤ ε.
Mironov [40] shows that any (ε, α)-Re´nyi private mechanism is also (ε+
log 1
δ
α−1 , δ)-differential private
for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence, if we wish to compute and release f(S) for some S ∈ X n, and
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖2 ≤ ρ for any neighboring samples S, S′, then the Gaussian mechanism
M(S) := f(S) + N
(
0, ρ2
(
1 {ε > 1}
ε
+
2 log(1/δ)
ε2
)
I
)
(1)
provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy for all ε > 0. For ε ≤ 1, the 1/ε term in the normal variance is
unnecessary [27]. (See Appendix A for this calculation.)
Rather than exhaustively discussing alternative privacy definitions, we note that each variant of
differential privacy (f -differential privacy [18] or concentrated differential privacy [26, 12]) similarly
rely on sample distances, saying that a mechanism M(·) is private if its output distribution changes
little (under an appropriate metric) when its input sample changes.
2.2 Element-level privacy definition
The standard distance in each privacy definition is the Hamming distance between samples S, S′;
this is satisfying, as it limits any inferences that can be made about an individual [28, 24]. In some
scenarios, this definition makes learning challenging (or, depending on the task and desired privacy
guarantee, essentially impossible) [23, 20]. It is thus natural to consider more fine-grained distance
notions to allow utility while providing sufficient privacy. For our purposes, it is useful to consider
a scenario frequent in large-scale learning applications, such as federated learning (e.g. [1]), where
individual users contribute multiple data items rather than a single item. In such cases, we protect
a user so that no one knows any particular thing the user has done. For example, a student with a
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phone sends many text messages, but may wish that his parents and teachers never know whether
he has ever sent a curse word, irrespective of the number of times he may or may not have sent
one.
To formalize this, we introduce element-level privacy. A sample or dataset S consists of n user’s
data (or data units) S = {x(u)}nu=1, while each user u maintains local data of size m(u), where the
size may depend on the user x(u) = {x(u)1 , . . . , x(u)m(u)}. For example, individual u’s data may consist
of the m(u) photos she has taken. External to the users are K clusters {c1, . . . , cK} partitioning X ,
where we view the cluster centroids as the elements to be made private, and each datapoint x
(u)
i
belongs to precisely one cluster ck (i.e. has a nearest element); we denote this by x
(u)
i ∈ ck. The
distance between two users’ local data x = {x1, . . . , xn} and x′ = {x′1, . . . , x′m} is then the number
of clusters c1, . . . , cK with different memberships for the two users’ data, that is,
duser(x, x
′) = duser({x1, . . . , xn}, {x′1, . . . , x′m})
:=
K∑
k=1
1
{{xi : xi ∈ ck} 6= {x′i : x′i ∈ ck}} , (2)
where {xi : xi ∈ ck} are implicitly multi-sets. Then two users’ data x, x′ are element-neighbors if
duser(x, x
′) ≤ 1; this is equivalent to allowing users to differ arbitrarily on one element of their data.
With this distance definition, we can then define the element-level sample distance by
delement(S, S
′) := min
pi∈Πn
n∑
u=1
duser(x
(u), x′(pi(u))). (3)
Two samples S, S′ of size n are element-neighbors if each of the units within the sample is identical
except for (at most) one unit x ∈ S, x′ ∈ S′, where duser(x, x′) ≤ 1. The definition of element level
privacy is now immediate: we take the sample distance dsample in any privacy definition (e.g. 2.1
or 2.2) to be delement.
Definition 2.3. A mechanism M satisfies element-level differential privacy or Re´nyi-differential
privacy if it satisfies Definition 2.1 or 2.2, (respectively) with distance dsample = delement.
Element-level differential privacy guarantees that the releases of a mechanism trained on users’
sensitive data does not leak any particular “element” the user has, that is, whether a user has data
belonging to any one of the clusters c1, . . . , cK , no matter how many data point belong to one of the
clusters. It is useful to compare this definition to two frequent definitions of privacy for large-scale
learning systems. The first is event-level privacy [30], which applies privacy commensurate with each
individual event a user performs, for example, whenever a user visits any website. This definition
may be too weak: consider a user who sends 50 text-messages consisting of the phrase “Hello!”
Then event-level privacy (say with Def. 2.1) guarantees a likelihood ratio bound of e50ε versus an
otherwise identical user who never uses the phrase “Hello!” In the case of element-level privacy,
however, the distance between these users is at most 1 regardless of how many times either says
“Hello!” The second common definition is user-level privacy, which corresponds to the standard
definitions with Hamming distance; by taking a single cluster c1 = X in the definitions (2)–(3) of
element level distances, one recovers user-level privacy, but as we shall see, the additional flexibility
of element-level privacy allows more utility.
To get a feel for Definition 2.3, it is instructive to consider two (somewhat stylized) examples.
Example 1 (Word frequency estimation): Consider the problem of estimating frequent words
used in text (SMS) messages. Ignoring punctuation, we treat each word as a cluster, so that for a
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dictionary of size d, a user u’s data x(u) = {x(u)1 , . . . , x(u)d } consists of the counts x(u)j ∈ N of the
times user u typed word j, a histogram of word counts. In Figure 1, for example, the leftmost
column has histogram with count 3 for the word “yo,” 3 for “bro,” and 0 for all other words. The
distance between two user data x, x′ is then duser(x, x′) =
∑d
j=1 1{xj 6= x′j}, the number of distinct
counts. In this case, two users are neighboring when their word use is identical except that one
may use a word j arbitrarily more or less than the other. 3
Example 2 (Website visit counts): Consider estimating the frequency of popular websites
(URLs) that users visit. In this case, a natural set of elements are domains (the first part
of a website name), while specific URLs belong to a single domain. For example, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc. and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NeXT belong to the
domain (cluster) wikipedia.org, while http://web.stanford.edu/~jduchi/ and http://web.
stanford.edu/~asi/ belong to stanford.edu. Then a user’s data consists of all URLs he or she
visits, while the distance between users is the number of domains in which they visit distinct URLs.
The intuition here is that any mechanism satisfying Definition 2.3 limits release of whether a user
ever even visits a website in a particular domain, for example, wikipedia.org, stanford.edu, or
youtube.com. In contrast, standard differential privacy would protect whether a user has ever used
the internet. 3
As these examples attempt to clarify, the important facet of element-level DP is that it protects
a data provider from anyone ever knowing any particular thing they have done, regardless of how
many times they have done it: visiting a domain, using a word, or other desired protected element.
2.3 Properties of element-level differential privacy
By replacing the standard Hamming distance in the different definitions of differential privacy
with the element-based distance (3), any element-level differentially private mechanism inherits the
typical properties private mechanisms enjoy, including privacy to post-processing, group privacy,
composition, and amplification of privacy by (anonymous) subsampling (see the book [25] for a
discussion of these desiderata). Almost all of these inheritances are immediate, but to give a flavor
of these results we present several for the (ε, δ)-element-level differentially private case.
Corollary 2.1 (Post-Processing). Let M : X n → Z be an (ε, δ)-element-level private mechanism.
For any (potentially randomized) function on Z, the mechanism f ◦M is (ε, δ)-element-level private.
Corollary 2.2 (Group Privacy). Let M : X n → Z be an (ε, δ)-element-level private mechanism.
Let S = {x(u)}nu=1 and S′ = {x′(u)}nu=1 ∈ X n be two samples. Then for any measurable set A,
P(M(S) ∈ A) ≤ edelement(S,S′)εP(M(S′) ∈ A) + delement(S, S′)e(delement(S,S′)−1)εδ.
See, for example, Dwork and Roth [25, Prop. 2.1, Thm. 2.2]. We also immediately have composition
for element-level DP. In this case, we consider adaptive composition of k mechanisms, where for
each i, we assume the output space Zi is a measurable space and
Mi : X n ×Z1 × · · · × Zi−1 → Zi
is (εi, δi)-element-level differentially private, meaning that for fixed z
i−1
1 , Mi(·, zi−11 ) is private.
The k-fold composition Mk ◦ · · · ◦M1 then has recursive definition Zi = Mi(S,Zi−11 ). We have the
following corollary (for the proof of differentially private version, see [25, Thm. 3.20 and Appendix B]
and [19, Corollary 6.26], and for the Re´nyi version, see [40, Prop. 1]).
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Corollary 2.3 (Composition). Let k ∈ N, Zi be measurable spaces, and Mi : X n × Z i−11 → Zi
be (εi, δi)-element-level DP. Then their k-fold composition is (
∑k
i=1 εi,
∑k
i=1 δi)-element-level DP.
Additionally, for any δ0 > 0, the composition is3
2
k∑
i=1
ε2i +
√√√√6 k∑
i=1
ε2i log
1
δ0
, δ0 +
k∑
i=1
δi
1 + eεi

element-level DP. If instead the mechanisms are (εi, α)-element-level Re´nyi private, the composition
is (
∑k
i=1 εi, α)-element-level Re´nyi private.
We also obtain that subsampling amplifies the privacy of our mechanisms (see [7, Thms. 8 &
9]). We consider the two most natural subsampling mechanisms. The first, which we denote Πq,
takes a sample S and returns a subsample S′ ⊂ S where each element x(u) ∈ S is included with a
fixed probability q ∈ (0, 1). The second, Πwom , samples m elements without replacement from S.
Corollary 2.4 (Amplification by subsampling). Let M be an (ε, δ)-element differentially private
mechanism that acts on samples of arbitrary size. Then
(i) For any q ∈ (0, 1), the subsampled mechanism M ◦Πq is (log(1 + q(eε − 1)), qδ)-element-level
differentially private.
(ii) For any m ≤ n ∈ N, the subsampled mechanism M ◦Πwom applied to samples of size |S| = n is
(log(1 + mn (e
ε − 1)), mn δ)-element-level differentially private.
Finally, we discuss amplification of Re´nyi element-level differential privacy by subsampling using
a particular Gaussian mechanism that will form the basis for our stochastic approximation results in
the sequel. In this case, we build off of Abadi et al.’s moments accountant [1], whose primitive is to
release a sum of vectors. Consider samples of the form S = {x(1), . . . , x(n)}, where each x(u) consists
of a collection x(u) = {x(u)k }Kk=1 of K vectors, where each x(u)k corresponds to a desired statistics
for element/cluster k and each individual vector satisfies ‖x(u)k ‖2 ≤ ρ for some ρ < ∞. The goal
is to release a sum of the entire sample,
∑n
u=1
∑K
k=1 x
(u)
k , but instead we consider subsampling by
users. In particular, for q ∈ [0, 1] and σ ≥ 0, let Bu ∈ {0, 1} be either i.i.d. Bernoulli(q) or uniform
on
∑
uBu = qn, let W ∼ N(0, I), and consider the mechanism
M(S) :=
n∑
u=1
Bu
( K∑
k=1
x
(u)
k
)
+ ρσW. (4)
Taking duser(x, x
′) as the user distance (2), we have the following corollary, with minor extension
to handle the variants of subsampling (i.i.d. or fixed size without replacement).
Corollary 2.5 (Moments accountant, [1] Lemma 3). Let α ≥ 1 and Pt be the N(t, σ2) distribution.
The mechanism (4) is (εα, α)-element-level Re´nyi differentially private with
εα(q, σ) :=
max {Dα (qP1 + (1− q)P0||qP−1 + (1− q)P0) , Dα (qP−1 + (1− q)P0||qP1 + (1− q)P0)} .
It is possible to numerically evaluate the Re´nyi divergences in the corollary, making them
effective in applications, though they are unavailable analytically. As a consequence of the corollary,
if we compose the mechanism (4) adaptively T times, composition for Re´nyi privacy immediately
7
guarantees the entire mechanism is (Tεα(q, σ), α)-Re´nyi element-level private. As a consequence,
recalling Mironov’s transformation from Re´nyi to approximate differential privacy [40], for any
δ > 0 the same composition is also (ε, δ)-element-level DP for ε = infα≥1 Tεα(q, σ) +
log 1
δ
α−1 . To give
a sense of the level of privacy maintained, we consider the bound of [1, Lemma 3]; a slight variant
of its proof yields
εα(q, σ) ≤ q
2α
1− q
1
σ2
+O
(
q3/σ3
)
for α ≤ σ2 log 1qσ and σ ≥ 2. Thus, for numerical constants c0, c1, this composition is (ε, δ)-element
level private for ε ≤ c0q2T and σ2 ≥ c1 q2Tε2 log 1δ .
We remark in passing and without proof that each of the preceding corollaries has an analog in
Dong et al.’s f -differential privacy [18].
3 Element-level private methods
One of our major goals is to demonstrate the methodological possibilities of mechanisms satisfying
element-level privacy, both to give some sense of the way to design mechanisms satisfying the
definition and to understand the potential utility benefits—in terms of more accurate estimation—
element-level privacy allows over user-level notions of privacy. To that end, we present three
examples in this section of increasing sophistication: discovering most frequent elements or heavy
hitters (Sec. 3.1), estimating multinomial frequencies (Sec. 3.2), and finally, stochastic optimization
and statistical learning (Sec. 3.3).
We begin by attempting to give a somewhat general picture, connecting to the classical Laplace
mechanisms and sensitivity analyses of Dwork et al. [28]; we specialize in the coming sections.
Suppose each user contributes a batch x = (x1, . . . , xm) of data, and we wish to compute the average
1
n
∑n
u=1 f(x
(u)) of a function f : Xm → R on S = {x(u)}nu=1. Standard mechanisms add noise that
scales with the global sensitivity of the function f , that is, gs(f) := supx∈Xm,x′∈Xm |f(x) − f(x′)|,
and the Laplace (respectively Gaussian) mechanisms for ε- or (ε, δ)-differentially private release are
M(S) :=
1
n
n∑
u=1
f(x(u))+
gs(f)
ε
·Lap(1) and M(S) := 1
n
n∑
u=1
f(x(u))+gs(f)·N
(
0,
1 {ε > 1}
ε
+
2 log 1δ
ε2
)
.
In contrast, given a partition {c1, . . . , cK} of X and corresponding user distance duser (recall Eq. (2)),
the analogous recipe here is to add noise scaling with the element sensitivity of f ,
es(f) := sup
x∈Xm,x′∈Xm
{|f(x)− f(x′)| s.t. duser(x, x′) ≤ 1} , (5)
which satisfies es(f) ≤ gs(f). Then the standard Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms become
M(S) :=
1
n
n∑
u=1
f(x(u)) + es(f) ·
{
Lap(1/ε) Laplace mechanism
N
(
0, 1{ε>1}ε +
2 log(1/δ)
ε2
)
Gaussian mechanism
(6)
and guarantee ε- or (ε, δ)-element-level differential privacy. We see utility gains whenever es(f)
gs(f), which we expect when the number K of elements is large, providing finer granularity privacy.
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3.1 Discovering heavy hitters
The first two examples we consider are to estimate properties of a multinomial. We consider a
sampling scheme where each of n users generates a vector X(u) ∈ Nd, X(u) iid∼ Multinomial(m, p),
where p = (p1, . . . , pd) ∈ Rd+ is an unknown vector of probabilities, pT1 = 1, and m ∈ N is the num-
ber of trials. The goal is to estimate different properties of the vector p, where X
(u)
j ∈ {0, . . . ,m}
indicates the count of appearances of item j for user u. For example, if these multinomials indicate
purchases users make in a grocery store, we may be interested in the items the most users purchase.
Bhaskar et al. [10] provide a sophisticated analysis of private algorithms for finding multisets of
frequent items in item stream; we consider a much simpler scenario than theirs (we care only about
individual items/elements, and wish to release an ordering of all elements rather than a top few,
the latter adding significant complexity to the problem), as we treat this more as an illustrative
example. While stylized, it is illustrative of the approaches possible with element-level privacy.
We assume that each item j ∈ {1, . . . , d} is an element, so that the user distance duser(x, x′) =∑d
j=1 1{xj 6= x′j}. Then we consider the mechanism
1(x) := [1 {xj > 0}]dj=1, Ĥ := M(S) :=
n∑
u=1
1(X(u)) + N
(
0, σ2Id
)
(7)
for some σ ≥ 0 to be chosen depending on the desired privacy. Following our discussion to begin
Sec. 3, the element sensitivity (5) of 1(x) is es(1(·)) = sup{‖1(x)− 1(x′)‖2 : duser(x, x′) ≤ 1} = 1,
so the following is immediate by Definition 2.2 and the Gaussian mechanism (1).
Lemma 3.1. Let ε ≥ 0 and assume that each observation X(u) satisfies ∑j X(u)j = m as above.
The mechanism (7) provides the following privacy guarantees.
(i) Let α ≥ 1 and take σ2 = αε . Then M is (ε, α)-element level Re´nyi private.
(ii) Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and σ2 = 1{ε>1}ε +
2 log 1
δ
ε2
. Then M is (ε, δ)-element level differentially private.
In contrast to the element-level noise scaling above, the global sensitivity of the indicator vector
1(·) is gs(1(·)) = sup{‖1(x)− 1(x′)‖2 : ‖x‖1 ≤ m, ‖x′‖1 ≤ m} =
√
2m, so that noise addition
mechanisms for standard differential privacy (e.g. the Gaussian mechanism (1)) add noise whose
variance on each coordinate scales as
σ2std := m ·
(
1 {ε > 1}
ε
+
2 log 1δ
ε2
)
to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Rather than attempting to recover the actual frequencies of appearance, we consider a loss
measuring the number of mis-ordered pairs of elements, an estimate suffers loss if it mis-orders a pair
of indices (i, j) where pi ≥ pj +γ for some threshold γ. We assume w.l.o.g. that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pd,
and define
Lorder(Ĥ) := E
[ d−1∑
j=1
d∑
l=j+1
1 {pj − pl ≥ γ} 1{Ĥj > Ĥl}
]
. (8)
We then have the following proposition, whose proof we provide in Appendix B.
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Proposition 1. Assume that p1 = maxj pj ≤ 12m . Let 0 ≤ t ≤ d and Ĥ denote the mechanism (7)
with Gaussian noise. Then Lorder(Ĥ) ≤ t2 whenever
γ ≥ max
{
32
nm
log
d
t
,
4
√
2σ
nm
√
log
d
t
,
12
√
2√
5
·
√
p1
m
√
n
√
log
d
t
}
.
We provide a bit of commentary on this result. First, we consider the scaling to achieve a
fixed error Lorder(Ĥ) ≤ t2, where the dominant terms are the second two in the maximum of
Proposition 1. Let γel denote the separation threshold at which we obtain small loss for element-
level privacy and γstd that for the mechanism providing standard (ε, δ)-differential privacy (i.e.
mechanism (7) with variance σ2std). Then ignoring logarithmic factors, we require
γel &
1
ε
1
nm
∨
√
p1
m
√
n
while γstd &
1
εn
√
m
∨
√
p1
m
√
n
.
Thus, in high dimensional situations where we expect that p1 is small enough that p1 
√
m/n, the
element-level private mechanism can provide substantially fewer ordering errors than a mechanism
providing user-level privacy.
3.2 Histogram estimation
We now turn to the problem of estimating item frequencies—histogram estimation—one of the
original motivations for differential privacy [28, Ex. 3]. We are in an identical setting to Sec. 3.1,
where X(u)
iid∼ Multinomial(m, p) for some m ∈ N and p ∈ Rd+ with pT1 = 1. We elaborate this
setting somewhat to allow more substantial elements, as in Example 2, by assuming there are K
clusters {c1, . . . , cK} partitioning [d]. For shorthand, for v ∈ Rd we let vck = [vj ]j∈ck ∈ R|ck|, and
we denote the probability of an item in ck by P (ck) = 1
T pck =
∑
j∈ck pj .
We consider a normal noise addition mechanism (6), but our first step is to design a function
insensitive to changes within the partition {c1, . . . , cK} of [d], reducing the element sensitivity. To
that end, we consider a mechanism that first projects each cluster ck of counts into an `2-ball, then
adds Gaussian noise. For v ∈ Rd, we define the projection
piρ,{ck}(v) := argmin
x∈Rd
{
‖x− v‖22 : ‖xck‖2 ≤ ρ
}
=
[
vck ·min {1, ρ/‖vck‖2}
]K
k=1
(with the obvious re-ordering in the second equality). The mechanism is then
M(S, ρ, {ck}) := 1
n
n∑
u=1
piρ,{ck}(X
(u)) + N
(
0,
ρ2σ2
n2
Id
)
. (9)
As with Lemma 3.1, we then immediately obtain the privacy of the mechanism (9).
Lemma 3.2. Let ε ≥ 0 and assume that each observation X(u) satisfies ∑j X(u)j = m as above.
The mechanism (9) provides the following privacy guarantees.
(i) Let α ≥ 1 and take σ2 = αε . Then M is (ε, α)-element-level Re´nyi private.
(ii) Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and σ2 = 1{ε>1}ε +
2 log 1
δ
ε2
. Then M is (ε, δ)-element-level differentially private.
We now turn to an investigation of the error of the mechanism (9), providing the following
proposition (whose proof we give in Appendix C).
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Proposition 2. Let m ≥ 3, t ≥ 0, and assume that for cluster probabilites P (c) = ∑j∈c pj we have
ρ ≥ min{3mP (c) + 3 logm + t,m} for each c ∈ {ck}. Then there exists q ∈ Rd+ with 1T qc ≤ P (c)
for each c ∈ {ck} and a numerical constant C > 0 such that for each j ∈ [d],
P
(|Mj(S, ρ, {ck})−mpj | ≥ 22−tqj + u) ≤ exp(−C min{ nu2
mpj
,
n2u2
σ2ρ2
,
nu
ρ
})
for all u ≥ 0. In addition, for numerical constants C0 ≤ C1 <∞,
C0
[
mpj
n
+
σ2ρ2
n2
]
≤ E [|Mj(S, ρ, {ck})−mpj |2] ≤ C1 [2−2tq2j + mpjn + σ2ρ2n2
]
.
If ρ ≥ m, the preceding inequalities hold with t =∞.
Let us compare standard mechanism’s errors with the element-level mechanism’s errors, focusing
on the squared error. For the user-level case, we have global sensitivity ρ = m, and the proposition
shows that the mean-squared error for each coordinate scales as max{mpjn , σ
2m2
n2
}. For element-level
privacy, if we take t = log n in the definition of ρ, we obtain mean-squared error scaling as
E
[
(Mj(S, ρ, {ck})−mpj)2
]
≤ O(1) · max
c∈{ck}
max
{
mpj
n
,
σ2
n2
[
m2P (c)2 + log2m+ log2 n
]}
.
Thus, whenever the individual contribution sizes m are large while probabilities of elements P (c) are
small, element-level mechanisms allow much more accurate estimation of frequencies than standard
private noise addition. Of course, the best choice of the projection threshold ρ for element-level
privacy requires some knowledge of the rough probabilities of each cluster, as otherwise, it is
impossible to choose ρ appropriately; a two-stage estimator (to give rough upper bounds on the
element probabilities P (c)) makes this feasible.
3.3 Statistical learning, risk minimization, and M-estimation
Our final application is a fairly careful investigation of statistical learning problems in the context
of element-level differential privacy and realistic federated learning problems, where individuals
contribute more than a single data point (e.g. because they send many text messages). The typical
statistical learning or generic M-estimation problem [31, 49] is as follows: for a sample space X and
parameter space Θ, we have a loss ` : Θ×X → R+, where `(θ;x) measures the loss of a parameter
θ on observation x, and we wish to minimize the average loss over a population P . In standard
empirical risk minimization or M-estimation, one receives X(u)
iid∼ P , then chooses θ̂n to minimize
the empirical average 1n
∑n
u=1 `(θ;X
(u)).
In our context of element privacy, we modify this slightly. Individuals (users) contribute batches
of data x ⊂ X , where the users are drawn from an underlying population P . Recalling Section 2.2,
we assume that there is a prespecified partition {c1, . . . , cK} of X , so that the element of protection
is whether a user with data x = {x1, . . . , xm} has any individual datum xi ∈ ck. Then the element-
level loss for a data batch x ∈ 2X averages losses within each element,
`el(θ;x) :=
K∑
k=1
1 {x ∩ ck 6= ∅} 1
card{xi ∈ ck}
∑
xi∈ck
`(θ;xi), (10)
that is, the sum of average losses in the non-empty elements in x. The idea of the averaging (10) is
to make the loss insensitive to modification of data belonging to any single ck. For an underlying
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population distribution P , we then wish to solve the risk minimization problem
minimize
θ∈Θ
Lel(θ) := E[`el(θ;X)] =
∫
`el(θ;x)dP (x). (11)
Given a sample S = {X(u)}nu=1 ∼ P , we approximate the risk (11) with
Lnel(θ) :=
1
n
n∑
u=1
`el(θ;X
(u)),
which we attempt to minimize as a proxy for (11). To describe our algorithms and their properties,
however, we require a brief digression to provide a general analysis of stochastic approximation pro-
cedures under noise, giving an asymptotic convergence result that may be interesting independent
of its privacy implications.
3.3.1 A digression to general stochastic optimization
Consider a generic population risk minimization problem
minimize
θ∈Θ
L(θ) := E[`(θ;X)] =
∫
`(θ;x)dP (x), (12)
where ` : Θ×X → R is a loss. We have a sample of size n from the population P , and we instead
consider applying a stochastic approximation algorithm on the empirical risk
Ln(θ) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ;Xi) (13)
for Xi
iid∼ P . We consider stochastic projected gradient methods for the problem (13). In our proofs
in Appendix D, we generalize this to Asi and Duchi’s general aProx (approximate proximal point)
family [5], though its full treatment somewhat obscures the privacy issues at hand.
In standard applications of stochastic gradient methods [45, 44, 41] to the population risk
problem (12), one receives an i.i.d. sequence Xk and updates
θk+1 = projΘ(θk − αk∇`(θk;Xk)),
where projΘ(v) = argminθ∈Θ{‖θ − v‖2} denotes the Euclidean projection onto Θ. We consider a
variant of the projected stochastic gradient method as it applies to triangular arrays, letting the
sample size n vary in the stochastic gradient update applied to the empirical risk (13). Focusing
on the case when the losses ` are smooth and convex, we show that as the number of iterations and
the sample size jointly increase, the projected stochastic gradient method on the empirical risk (13)
gives asymptotically normal iterates. To that end, consider problems indexed by sample size n,
with a triangular array of samples Sn := {Xni }ni=1 for Xni iid∼ P . Let σn ≥ 0 be a fixed variance, and
let Zi be an i.i.d. sequence of random vectors with E[Zi] = 0 and Cov(Zi) = Σz. (We allow σn > 0
because we will use the coming iteration in a private setting, where noise is essential.) For each
k ∈ N, let ri(k) be an index chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , n}, and for k = 1, 2, . . . , and
n ∈ N, consider the noisy stochastic projected gradient iteration
gnk :=
1
αk
[
θnk − projΘ
(
θnk − αk∇`(θnk ;Xnri(k))
)]
θnk+1 := θ
n
k − αk (gnk + σnZk) .
(14)
12
Under a few simplifying assumptions on the problem (12) reminiscent of the typical classical
conditions for M-estimation [49, Ch. 5.3], we can prove that the iterates θnk enjoy asymptotic
optimality properties as n, k →∞.
Assumption A1. The domain Θ ⊂ Rd is compact convex, and there exists L0 : X → R+ such that
`(·;x) is L0(x)-Lipschitz over Θ. The minimizer θ? := argminθ∈Θ L(θ) is unique with θ? ∈ int Θ,
and L is C2 in a neighborhood of θ?, with ∇2L(θ?)  0. In addition, there exists an  > 0 and
L1, L2 : X → R+ such that `(·;x) has L1(x)-Lipschitz gradient and L2(x)-Lipschitz Hessian on the
neighborhood θ? + B ⊂ int Θ. Finally, E[L2a(X)] <∞ for a ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
In the projected stochastic gradient iteration (14), we assume that we run the algorithm (on
random subsamples) for k = k(n) iterations, where the total k depends on the sample size. We
usually expect that k = γn for some γ ≥ 1, though in some cases we may wish to take k/n→∞.
We also (typically) assume the variance σn, which we add for privacy, is decreasing.
We have the following theorem, whose proof we provide in Appendix D.
Theorem 1. Let Assumption A1 hold. Define θ
n
k =
1
k
∑k
i=1 θ
n
i and assume that αk = α0k
−β for
some β ∈ (12 , 1). Define Σ` = Cov(∇`(θ?;X)) and Σz = Cov(Z). Assume that the iteration count
k = k(n) satisfies limn→∞
k(n)
n = γ > 0, and that limn→∞ σn = σ ≥ 0. Then as n→∞,
√
n(θ
n
k − θ?) d→N
(
0,∇2L(θ?)−1
(
Σ` +
1
γ
(Σ` + σ
2Σz)
)
∇2L(θ?)−1
)
.
We provide a bit of commentary. First, the optimal covariance possible (by the local asymptotic
minimax theorem for stochastic optimization [22]) for any estimator of θ? given n observations is
∇2L(θ?)−1Σ`∇2L(θ?)−1. Thus, if γ = lim kn is large, we have limited asymptotic efficiency loss;
moreover, if the limiting variance σ2n → σ2 is zero, then the efficiency loss is precisely the factor
1 + 1/γ. In our privacy application, there is a tradeoff between k, the number of iterations, and
the scale σn of the necessary noise given a sample of size n.
3.3.2 A private stochastic gradient method
We now turn to the appropriate variant of the projected gradient method (14) for privacy. The
key from an element-level privacy perspective is to apply a projected gradient update on each of a
user’s elements, then average them together. Algorithm 1 captures this.
Algorithm 1 Element-level projected gradient update sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, x)
Require: Projection parameter ρ, stepsize α, initial model θ0, partition of X into C = {c1, . . . , cK},
and user data x = {x1, . . . , xm}
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that x ∩ ck 6= ∅
Set B = {xi : xi ∈ ck}
θ+k ← projΘ(θ0 − α 1|B|
∑
x∈B∇`(θ0;x))
∆k ← (θ+k − θ0)/α and [∆k]ρ ← ∆k min{1, ρ‖∆k‖2 }
return
∑
k[∆k]ρ
Because Algorithm 1 divides its updates into the clusters ck before computing projections
(clipping them to a particular radius) and updates, its combination with appropriate noise im-
mediately yields several privacy properties. The most important result for us is to apply Alg. 1
in a stochastic-gradient-type scheme, which allows us to both leverage the moments-accountant
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(recall Corollary 2.5) and convergence guarantees of stochastic gradient-type methods. Following
the subsampling (4), for q ∈ (0, 1) let Bu iid∼ Bernoulli(q) or Bu be uniform on
∑
uBu = qn, and for
a sample S = {x(u)}nu=1 define the subsampled mechanism
Mσ,ρ,α,q(S; θ0) :=
( n∑
u=1
Bu · sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, x(u))
)
+ N(0, ρ2σ2I).
For any sequence of stepsizes, we may define the private stochastic approximation method
θk+1 := θk − αk 1
qn
Mσ,ρ,αk,q(S; θk). (15)
We consider the privacy of the iteration (15) both in the standard (user-level) private scenario and
under element-level privacy. It is immediate that the update sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, ·) in Alg. 1 has element
sensitivity at most 2ρ, where neighboring data x, x′ guarantee ‖sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, x)− sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, x′)‖2 ≤
2ρ. For standard privacy, we consider the global sensitivity of the update: assuming the upper
bound card(x) ≤M on the cardinality of user data, we have ‖sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, x)− sgd-el`α,ρ(θ0, x′)‖2 ≤
2(K ∧M)ρ for any two sets x, x′ ⊂ X . We immediately obtain the following two corollaries on the
privacy of the private stochastic gradient update (15).
Corollary 3.1. Let θ1:T := {θ1, . . . , θT } be the outputs of the iteration (15) and εα(q, σ) be as
in Corollary 2.5. Then θ1:T is (Tεα(q, σ), α)-element-level Re´nyi private, and for any δ > 0, is
(infα≥1{Tεα(q, σ) + log δ−1α−1 }, δ)-element-level differentially private.
Corollary 3.2. Let the conditions of Corollary 3.1 hold. Let σstd = σ/(K ∧M). Then θ1:T is
(Tεα(q, σstd), α)-Re´nyi differentially private, and for any δ > 0, is (infα≥1{Tεα(q, σstd)+ log δ
−1
α−1 }, δ)-
element-level differentially private.
Pursuing the discussion following Corollary 2.5, let us assume we subsample a constant fraction
q = m/n of the data in the iteration (15), where m is fixed and does not grow with n. Then for
0 < δ < 1, the entire collection θ1:T is (O(1)ε, δ)-element-level differentially private, where
ε ≤ inf
α∈[0,σ2 log n
m
]
{
Tq2
σ2
+
Tq2α
σ2
+
log δ−1
α
}
=
Tm2
n2σ2
+O(1) ·max
{√
Tm2
n2σ2
log
1
δ
,
log δ−1
σ2 log nm
}
. (16)
3.3.3 Applications of element-level private stochastic approximation
While the updates (15) provide privacy no matter the loss, their utility comes in conjunction with
our analysis in Theorem 1. To that end, we now provide a generic convergence result with a brief
application to generalized linear model estimation; our coming experiments evidence the utility
of our definitions and mechanisms. We first recall the element-level population risk (11), which
averages a standard loss ` into the element-level loss `el. We make a few additional assumptions on
the standard loss ` over our data X parallelling Assumption A1.
Assumption A2. There exists L0 <∞ such that θ 7→ `(θ;x) is L0-Lipschitz over Θ for each x ∈ X .
The minimizer θ? := argminθ∈Θ Lel(θ) is unique with θ? ∈ int Θ, and Lel is C2 on an -neighborhood
of θ? with ∇2Lel(θ?)  0. There are L1, L2 : X → R+ such that `(·;x) has L1(x)-Lipschitz gradient
and L2(x)-Lipschitz Hessian on θ
? + B ⊂ Θ, where E[L2a(X)] <∞ for a ∈ {1, 2}.
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The key consequence of the first Lipschitz condition in Assumption A2 is that no projection
is necessary in Alg. 1 to guarantee that sgd-el`α,ρ(θ, ·) has bounded element sensitivity, so that the
private iteration (15) is an instance of the stochastic approximation iteration (14). Indeed, the
Lipschitz condition is equivalent to ‖∂`(θ;x)‖2 ≤ L0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and in turn, the definition (14)
guarantees that ‖gnk‖2 ≤ ‖∇`(θnk ;Xnri(k))‖2 ≤ L0 (cf. [21]). As a consequence, the element-level
update of Algorithm 1 performs no projection in the definition [∆k]ρ whenever ρ ≥ L0.
Now, recall the asymptotic normality result of Theorem 1. For each n we let {X(u)}nu=1 iid∼ P
and θni be generated by the iteration (15) for the given sample {X(u)}nu=1 and assume the projection
level ρ ≥ L0. Let the stepsizes αk = α0k−β for some β ∈ (12 , 1) and subsampling rate q = m/n
for a fixed m. Combining Theorem 1 with Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 and the discussion immediately
following (16), we have the following proposition, which shows that the private stochastic iteration
guarantees both asymptotic normality, and privacy.
Proposition 3. Let Assumption A2 hold, and define θ
n
k =
1
k
∑k
i=1 θ
n
i , where the number of itera-
tions k = k(n) satisfies limn k(n)/n = γ. Let Σel = Cov(∇`el(θ?;X)). Then
√
n(θ
n
k − θ?) d→N
(
0,∇2Lel(θ?)−1
(
Σel +
1
γ
( 1
m
Σel +
ρ2σ2
m2
I
))
∇2Lel(θ?)−1
)
.
Fix δ > 0 and let ε(τ) = infα{γm2nτ2 + γm
2
nτ2
α+ log δ
−1
α | α ≤ τ2 log nm} for shorthand. Then
(i) If σ2 ≥ 2, then the collection {θni }ki=1 is (O(1) · ε(σ), δ)-element-level differentially private.
(ii) Assume that each user data x has cardinality at most card(x) ≤ M . If σ2 ≥ (K ∧M)2τ2,
where τ2 ≥ 2, then then the collection {θni }ki=1 is (O(1) · ε(τ), δ)-differentially private.
As in the preceding examples, we see roughly the same tradeoffs between user-level (standard) and
element-level privacy: for a given level ε, it is possible to provide the less-stringent element-level
privacy with noise a factor K ∧M less than that for user-level privacy.
In general, the partitioning that the element-level loss (10) and risk (11) in the data space may
change the resulting estimated parameters from more standard sampling schemes. However, any
normalization of user’s data (as some users contribute many data points, some contribute few) in
any application engenders changes in the “optimal” parameter θ?, so we believe this of limited
impact. To give a somewhat concrete example, consider generalized linear models (GLMs) [36]:
Example 3 (Generalized linear models): In a GLM, for an individual data point x ∈ Rd we have
Y with density (or p.m.f.)
pθ(y | x) = exp(T (y)θTx−A(θ;x))h(y),
where h is a base measure, A(θ;x) is the log-partition function A(θ;x) = log
∫
eT (y)θ
T xh(y)dy, and
T the sufficient statistic. In this case for loss `(θ;x, y) = − log pθ(y | x), any partition of X into
elements guarantees that θ? = argminθ Lel(θ) remains fixed. The Fisher information may change,
of course: given a partition of X into clusters {ck}Kk=1, defining pk = P(X(u) ∩ ck 6= ∅), we have
Lel(θ) =
∑K
k=1 pkE[`(θ;X,Y ) | X ∈ ck], so that modifying the partition ck changes ∇2Lel(θ?) and
Σel; in some situations, this can decrease the asymptotic variance, while in others, it may increase,
depending on the degree of stratification and relative probabilities. 3
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4 Experiments
To demonstrate the behavior of element-level private mechanisms, we present a series of experi-
mental results in crowdsourced (federated) learning and stochastic optimization. We perform both
simulations, where we may control all aspects of the experiments, and real-world experiments. Our
theoretical results and intuition suggest that as the number of elements we consider grows—meaning
that the elements provide a finer partition of the input space X—we should observe performance
improvements. In large-scale estimation, such as federated learning [37], user data is rarely i.i.d.
For example, some users take many photos of their children, others of dogs, others of hikes with
friends; thus, a user may provide data only relating to a few elements. Motivated by this potential
variability, for datasets with no pre-existing users, we diversify our experiments by constructing
pseudo-users and assigning them varying numbers of elements.
In the remainder of the section, we present results for histogram estimation (Sec. 4.1), a sim-
ulated logistic regression experiment (Sec. 4.2), and then two experiments on fitting large image
classification models, the first on tuning a model to a new dataset based on Flickr images (Sec. 4.3),
and the second an investigation on training a full neural network (Sec. 4.4). An essential part of
each experiment is to describe how we choose the elements to protect—this decision is more of
a policy decision than a purely mathematical one, and consequently deserves care and thought,
especially in real-world applications. In each experiment, we provide user-level or element-level
(ε, δ)-differential privacy, where δ = n−1.1, where n is the total number of users.
4.1 Histogram estimation
We consider the problem of estimating frequent words on a dataset consisting of Reddit com-
ments [9], where unique usernames identify users. Proposition 2 predicts that element-level privacy
with appropriate parameter settings in the mechanism (9) should reduce squared error by a factor
of roughly maxc∈{ck} P (c)
2, so that increasing cluster counts should yield further improvements.
In the experiment, we consider the first n = 2000 users with the largest number of tokens
(words), using as our dictionary those words in the vocabulary of GloVe (Global Vectors for Word
Representation) [43], yielding dictionary of size d = 400000, where we choose a random subsample
of each user’s words to obtain m = 4000 words per individual. Additionally, we remove the 100
most frequent stopwords (e.g. “the”, “and”, “a”). GloVe embeds words into R100, and using these
embedded vectors, we cluster the d = 4 · 105-sized vocabulary into K = 10, 100, 1000, 10000, and
400000 clusters (elements); assuming the embedding is “semantically meaningful” as claimed [43],
these elements should naturally demarcate themes and conversation foci. Within each experiment,
we calculate the histogram to be estimated by first randomly dividing users into two disjoint sets
S0 and S1 and defining the “true” histogram H0 =
1
m|S0|
∑
u∈S0 X
(u). We then estimate H0 using
the sample S1 via the mechanism (9), Ĥ =
1
mM(S1, ρ, {ck}). In each individual experiment—that
is, for each choice of privacy level ε and total number of clusters—we use a validation set to choose
the truncation threshold ρ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} ∪ {15, 20, . . . , 50} ∪ {70, 100, 150, 200} minimizing the
mean-squared error, so that our results reflect the best behavior for each method.
We estimate the baseline mean squared error to be ‖H0 −H1‖22. In Figure 2, we plot the ratio
‖Ĥ −H0‖22/‖H1 −H0‖22 of squared error for the private estimation algorithm over the baseline mean
squared error against the privacy parameter ε. The results broadly are as expected: increasingly fine
partitions yield better estimators. Moreover, for a given privacy level ε, the separation between
the mean-squared error is roughly linear on a logarithmic scale, which is what we expect from
reductions scaling as maxc∈{ck} P (c)
2.
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Figure 2. Mean-squared error ratio ‖Ĥ −H0‖22/‖H1 −H0‖22 of private error over baseline error
for word frequency estimation on a dataset of Reddit comments, plotted versus privacy level ε.
Confidence intervals are ±1.64 standard errors. Each line corresponds to a partition of the space of
words into 1 (user-level) or more clusters ck.
4.2 Simulated logistic regression
The remainder of our experiments consider M-estimation and statistical risk minimization, as in
Section 3.3. We begin with a simulation study to more precisely control the hypotheses and
experiments, focusing on logistic regression. For each experiment, we generate data via the following
hierarchical model: first, we draw K = 10 element centers c1, . . . , cK
iid∼ Uni(Sd−1) and θ? ∼
Uni(Sd−1). Then we generate pairs (Xi, Yi) ∈ Rd × {±1} according to the logistic model
pθ(y | x) = 1
1 + exp(−y〈x, θ?〉) , Ci ∼ Uni({ck}
K
k=1) and Xi = Ci + Uni(Sd−1),
so each datum Xi belongs to the cluster around element Ci. Following the model that users provide
several data points, we generate data for n = 1000 users, each consisting of m = 50 pairs (xi, yi).
Given a collection of users, we apply the private stochastic gradient method (15) with the
element-level update sgd-el`α,ρ(θ, (x, y)) of Alg. 1. We vary the diversity of data users provide, so
that in different experiments users provide data from k = 2, 5, 8 of the K = 10 clusters; we expect
that the more diverse the data the users provide (i.e. coverage of clusters), the more element-level
privacy should improve over standard (user-level) private mechanisms.
We calculate the privacy parameter ε for both user- and element-level privacy using Abadi
et al.’s moments accountant (Corollary 2.5 and [1]). We perform T = 200 private updates (15),
choosing stepsize αk = α0/
√
k. In any real-world deployment, one chooses hyperparameters to
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Figure 3. Logistic regression simulation with user sample size n = 1000, each user providing m = 50
datapoints, in dimension d = 10. The horizontal axis indexes privacy parameter ε while the vertical
axis indexes error ‖θ̂ − θ?‖2 after T = 200 stochastic gradient updates (15). Confidence intervals are
±1.64 standard errors. The legend label “clusters: k/10” represent the number of clusters (elements)
a user has (ku) over the total possible number of distinct clusters (10).
maximize a method’s performance, so for each fixed privacy level ε, we (experimentally) find a
subsampling rate q and initial stepsize α0 to yield the best performance for each method.
We show results in Figure 3, where we plot the error ‖θ̂ − θ?‖2 for the final estimated θ̂ of the
private stochastic gradient iteration against the provided privacy level ε. Broadly, the results are
as expected: as we increase the diversity of elements for which each user has data, the estimation
error decreases for a given element privacy level ε, while user-level private mechanisms exhibit little
change on this axis. Of note, however, is the baseline error: the more clusters (i.e. more stratified
the data per user), the better a non-private stochastic gradient scheme estimates θ?. We believe
this occurs because the stratification of data within users improves problem conditioning. Even
with this difference, however, the convergence of the error of the private stochastic gradient method
to that of the non-private error is faster for scenarios with more clusters.
4.3 Large-scale multiclass image classification: the Flickr dataset
Following our simulated logistic regression results, we investigate element-level privacy in the con-
text of model fitting for a large image classification task, following our methodology in Section 3.3.
In this experiment, we vary several parameters: the privacy level ε ∈ {1, 3,∞}, the number of
distinct clusters into which we partition the input space (K = 50, 500), and, as we discuss in the
introduction to the experiments, we also vary the diversity of images of individual users, so that we
provide nominal “users” with data from 5, 30, or 100 distinct clusters/elements. As in the previous
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experiments, we expect the following: as the number of clusters K increases, element-level private
methods should improve relative to the user-level private method, and similarly, as the diversity
of individual users’ images increases (the number of distinct elements), we expect to see further
relative improvement. This is natural: in Algorithm 1 and the update (15), the magnitude of noise
addition relative to the scale of a user’s contribution decreases linearly in the number of distinct
elements a user provides.
To this end, we perform a model tuning experiment on the Flickr dataset [48] using a ResNet50
network [32] pre-trained on ImageNet [17], with reference implementation [42]. This tuning means
we fit only the last layer of the network, that is, we fit a multiclass logistic regression on input
features x ∈ Rd, d = 2048, defined by the outputs of the second-to-last ResNet50 layer. We use the
100 most popular Flickr image tags as labels, which represent 89% of the chosen data, and used an
“unknown” label for anything remaining, resulting in a 101 class multiclass problem. To construct
the elements into which we partition the images, we chose a uniformly random subset of 100,000
Flickr images, then used KMeans++ [4] to cluster them into K = 50 and 500 clusters. Then a
given image representation x simply belongs to the nearest cluster centroid. To fit the resulting
model, we use the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 1 as applied in the update (15). We
construct a nominal collection of n = 8000 users, assigning each m = 100 labeled images (x, y). We
vary the image allocations, so that (depending on the experiment) each user has images from on
average k = 5, 30, 100 distinct elements. We perform T = 40,000 updates (15) in each experiment.
We present results in Figure 4, plotting the maximum top-5 accuracy achieved (i.e. there is
no loss if the correct label belongs to the five highest-scoring predicted labels for an example x)
versus iteration for many parameter settings. In the figure, we simultaneously present results for
different privacy levels ε, number K of clusters, and diversity of clusters per user. We highlight a
few of the most salient points. First, user-level privacy with ε = 1 is substantially worse than any
other method. Second, we see roughly what we expect, in that the element-level private algorithms
achieve higher accuracy as the number of clusters and per-user diversity increase. Given that true
internet-scale datasets are several times larger than the 400,000 image dataset we construct, this
suggests the element-level private mechanisms can provide strong utility with satisfactory privacy.
4.4 Fully training a neural network: image classification on CIFAR10
We present our final experimental results for a classification problem on the CIFAR10 dataset [35],
showing that it is possible to privately train a neural network while providing element-level pri-
vacy. We use the relatively simple convolutional neural network model architecture in the PyTorch
tutorial [42]. To construct the cluster centroids (elements), we mimic the method we propose for
Flickr: we upsample the CIFAR image (using PyTorch), pass the resulting image through the
pre-trained ResNet50 network above, and then cluster the resulting 2048-dimensional vectors using
KMeans++ [4] to construct K = 100 centroids that partition the CIFAR dataset.
We again perform a federated learning experiment over T = 40,000 steps (Alg. 1 and up-
date (15)). Similar to our experiment with Flickr—except that we train a full neural network—we
considered n ∈ {2, 8} · 103 users, each assigned m = 100 images from k = 5 or 30 of the K = 100
elements we cluster. Users may have repeat data. In Figure 5, we plot the difference in top-1 ac-
curacy between a private method and the fully-trained (non-private) tutorial convolutional neural
network [42] against iteration, varying the privacy parameter ε and cluster diversity. As expected,
we see two effects: first, as the sample size n grows, the accuracy improves; second, as the diversity
of elements per user decreases, performance degrades as expected. All user-level private instan-
tiations have accuracy more at least 15%-worse than the non-private accuracy. Conversely, the
element-level-private algorithm with ε = 3, n = 8000, and high element diversity per-user (30/100
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Figure 4. Training curves for the private element-level stochastic gradient method, Alg. 1 coupled
with update (15), over T = 40,000 updates on the Flickr dataset. Each line displays the best top-
5 prediction accuracy achieved before iteration t. The legend ratio k/K represent the number of
clusters (elements) a user has (ku) over the total possible number of distinct clusters (K).
data clusters present) achieves top-1 accuracy nearly equal to non-private training.
5 Discussion
We conclude with a brief discussion. Element-level differential privacy allows one to choose the
granularity at which to provide privacy protections. As we see both in the theoretical results and
experiments, this can allow substantially improved utility over standard private algorithms. This
additional flexibility, however, comes with a challenge: one must carefully choose the elements
(partition of the data space X ) to provide sufficient privacy, as increasing the number of clusters
allows improved statistical accuracy while decreasing the number improves privacy. This apparent
tradeoff requires a per-application policy decision, where one balances privacy—in the coarseness
of the partitioning into elements—against utility; as in standard privacy, where the choice of ε is a
policy decision that must trade privacy against utility, care is likely necessary here.
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Figure 5. Difference in accuracy of a convolutional neural network model on the CIFAR10 dataset
trained with privacy and without. Each line corresponds to given privacy type (element- or user-
level), privacy level ε, effective number of users n ∈ {2000, 8000}, and diversity of elements each user
provides (k = 5 (5/100) or k = 30 (30/100)). Confidence interval are ±1.64 standard errors.
A Sufficiency of mechanism (1)
The Re´nyi divergence between Gaussian distributions Pi = N(µi, σ
2I) is Dα (P0||P1) = α‖µ0−µ1‖
2
2σ2
.
Thus for any mechanism defined by M(S) = f(S) + N(0, ρ2σ2), we have Dα (M(S)||M(S′)) ≤ α2σ2 ,
so that Mironov’s results [40] guarantee the mechanism is ( α
2σ2
+ log(1/δ)α−1 , δ)-differentially private.
Setting α = 1 + 2 log(1/δ)ε and σ
2 = (1 + 2ε−1 log 1δ )/ε gives the result.
B Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by presenting two lemmas that give us the tools to prove the proposition.
Lemma B.1. Let qj = 1 − (1 − pj)m, qjl = 1 − (1 − pl − pj)m, X ∼ Multinomial(m, p), and
Y = 1(X). Then E[Yj ] = qj, E[Y 2j ] = qj, E[YjYl] = qj + ql − qjl, and Var(Yj − Yl) ≤ qj + ql.
Proof The first and second claims are immediate. For the third, we have
E[YjYl] = P(Xj > 0, Xl > 0)
= 1− P(Xj = 0, Xl = 0)− P(Xj > 0, Xl = 0)− P(Xj = 0, Xl > 0).
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As Xj | (Xl = 0) ∼ Binomial(m, pj1−pl ), we have
P(Xj > 0, Xl = 0) = P(Xj > 0 | Xl = 0)P(Xl = 0)
=
[
1−
(
1− pj
1− pl
)m]
(1− pl)m = qjl − ql,
and we similarly obtain that P(Xj = 0, Xl = 0) = 1 − qlj . Algebraic manipulations then give
E[YjYl] = qj + ql − qjl.
Finally, Var(Yj − Yl) ≤ E[Y 2j + Y 2l ] ≤ qj + ql, as desired.
Next, we prove the upper-bound on the probability that the private mechanism Ĥ mis-orders the
two bins i and j > i.
Lemma B.2. Let i < j, so that qi = 1− (1− pi)m ≥ qj = 1− (1− pj)m. Then
P
(
Ĥi < Ĥj
)
≤ exp
(
−min
{
5n(qi − qj)2
12vij + 20
σ2
n
,
n(qi − qj)
8
})
.
See Section B.1 for a proof.
By a binomial expansion, we see that if pi + pj ≤ 1m , then
qi − qj = (1− pj)m − (1− pi)m ≥ m(pi − pj)− m
2
2
(p2i − p2j ) ≥
m
2
(pi − pj)
qi + qj = 2− (1− pj)m − (1− pi)m ≤ m(pi + pj) + m
2
2
(p2i + p
2
j ) ≤ 3mpi,
so Lemma B.2 implies
E[1 {pi − pj ≥ γ} 1{Ĥj > Ĥi}] ≤ max
{
exp
(
−5nm
2(pi − pj)2
48vij + 80
σ2
n
)
, exp
(
−nm(pi − pj)
16
)}
≤ max
{
exp
(
−5nm
2γ2
144pi
)
, exp
(
−n
2m2γ2
16σ2
)
, exp
(
−nmγ
16
)}
,
where the second inequality used the variance bound vij ≤ qi + qj ≤ 3mpi of Lemma B.1.
Setting γ as in the statement of the proposition and summing over all i < j in the loss Lorder
of Eq. (8) gives the result.
B.1 Proof of Lemma B.2
Let i < j so that qi ≥ qj , as pi ≥ pj by assumption. Define the zero-mean random variable
∆
(u)
ij = Y
(u)
i − Y (u)j − (qi − qj). Then we have
P(Ĥi ≤ Ĥj) = P
( n∑
u=1
∆
(u)
ij + N(0, 2σ
2) ≤ −n(qi − qj)
)
.
Using that |∆(u)ij | ≤ 2 and vij := Var(Yi − Yj) ≤ qi + qj by Lemma B.1, for |λ| ≤ 14 standard
sub-exponential bounds [51, Ch. 2] give that E[exp(λ∆ij)] ≤ exp(3λ
2vij
5 ) for |λ| ≤ 14 . The Chernoff
bound technique then yields
P
( n∑
u=1
∆
(u)
ij + N(0, σ
2) ≤ −t
)
≤ exp
(
3λ2vijn
5
+ λ2σ2 − λt
)
for |λ| ≤ 1
4
.
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Optimizing by setting λ = min{14 , 5t6nvij+10σ2 } gives
P
( n∑
u=1
∆
(u)
ij + N(0, σ
2) ≤ −t
)
≤ exp
(
−min
{
5t2
12nvij + 20σ2
,
t
8
})
.
Substituting t = n(qi − qj) gives the lemma.
C Proof of Proposition 2
For shorthand, let p̂(ρ) = 1n
∑n
u=1 piρ,{ck}(X
(u)) be the non-privatized projection vector. We com-
pute the bias and bounds on the moment generating function of each coordinate of the vector.
Bias of the projected vector We control the bias for each element cluster. Fix c ∈ {c1, . . . , ck}.
Defining Y =
∑
j∈cXj , we evidently have that Xc = piρ,{ck}(X)c if Y ≤ ρ, that is, the coordinate
is unprojected. Thus we obtain
‖E[p̂c(ρ)−mpc]‖1 =
∥∥E[(Xc −mpc)1 {Y ≤ ρ}] + E[(piρ,{ck}(X)c −mpc)1 {Y > ρ}]∥∥1
≤ ‖E[Xc −mpc]‖1 +
∥∥E[(piρ,{ck}(X)c −mXc)1 {Y > ρ}]∥∥1
≤ E
[∥∥piρ,{ck}(X)c −Xc∥∥1 1 {Y > ρ}] . (17)
To bound the remaining term in inequality (17), we present two lemmas, whose proofs we defer to
Sections C.1 and C.2, respectively.
Lemma C.1. Let X ∼ Binomial(m, p), p ≤ 1/4, and l ≥ 3mp. Then
m∑
i=dle
P(X ≥ i) ≤ 2P(X ≥ dle) ≤ 4P(X = dle).
Lemma C.2. Let X ∼ Binomial(m, p), l = 3mp+ 3 logm+ t and m ≥ 3. Then
P(X = dle) ≤ p2−t.
The variable Y ∼ Binomial(m,P (ck)) in expression (17), and |Xi − piρ,{ck}(X)i| ≤ Xi so
‖Xc − piρ,{ck}(X)c‖1 ≤ m. Thus we have
E
[∥∥piρ,{ck}(X)c −Xc∥∥1 1 {Y > l}] ≤ mP(Y > l) (i)≤ 4mP(Y = dle)
(ii)
≤ 4mP (c)2−(t+logm) ≤ 22−tP (c) (18)
where inequality (i) is a consequence of Lemma C.1 and (ii) of Lemma C.2 once we recall that
ρ ≥ 3mp+ 4 logm+ t.
Variance and moment generating function We have Var(piρ,{ck}(X)j) ≤ Var(Xj) = mpj(1−
pj), because projections reduce variance. We also have piρ,{ck}(X)j ≤ ρ, so as a consequence, we
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obtain the moment generating function bound
E[exp(λ(piρ,{ck}(X)j − E[piρ,{ck}(X)j ]))]
= 1 +
λ2Var(piρ,{ck}(X)j)
2
+
∞∑
k=3
λkE[(piρ,{ck}(X)j − E[piρ,{ck}(X)j ])k]
k!
≤ 1 + λ
2mpj
2
+ λ2mpj
∞∑
k=3
λk−2ρk−2
k!
≤ exp (λ2mpj)
for |λ| ≤ ρ−1, where we have used that 1 + x ≤ ex. Thus for any coordinate j we have
E [exp(λn(Mj(S, ρ, {ck})− E[Mj(S, ρ, {ck})]))] ≤ exp
(
λ2nmpj +
λ2ρ2σ2
2
)
for all |λ| ≤ ρ−1. Using the bias bound (18), we see that there exists a q ∈ R+ with 1T qc ≤ P (c)
for each cluster c ∈ {ck} such that for any cluster c, j ∈ c, and u ≥ 0 we have
P
(|Mj(S, ρ, {ck})−mpj | ≥ 22−tqj + u) ≤ exp(λ2mpj
n
+
λ2σ2ρ2
2n2
− λu
)
.
Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1 (see specifically Appendix B.1), we thus obtain that
for a numerical constant C > 0 and all u ≥ 0,
P
(|Mj(S, ρ, {ck})−mpj | ≥ 22−tqj + u) ≤ exp(−C min{ nu2
mpj
,
n2u2
σ2ρ2
,
nu
ρ
})
.
The variance bounds are immediate by noting that no (non-private) estimator has mean-squared
error asymptotically better than
mpj(1−pj)
n .
C.1 Proof of Lemma C.1
For j ≥ 3mp we have
P(X = j + 1)
P(X = j)
=
(
m
j+1
)
pj+1(1− p)m−j−1(
m
j
)
pj(1− p)m−j =
m− j
j
p
1− p ≤
4
3
(
m
j
− 1
)
p ≤ 1
2
. (19)
By quasi-convexity of the ratio function, the last inequality implies that P(X ≥ j+1)/P(X ≥ j) ≤ 12
for j ≥ 3mp. The first inequality of the lemma now follows as ∑∞i=0 2−i = 2. The second inequality
then follows as P(X ≥ l) = ∑∞i=l P(X = i) ≤ P(X = l)∑∞i=0 2−i.
C.2 Proof of Lemma C.2
Inequality (19) in the proof of Lemma C.1 gives P(X=j+1)P(X=j) ≤ 1/2 for j ≥ 3mp. We consider two
cases according to the value of p. First, if p ≤ 1/m2, we have mp < 1 and so
P(X = dle)
(i)
≤ P(X = d3mp+ 2 logme)2−t
(ii)
≤ P(X = 2)2−t ≤ m2p22−t ≤ p2−t,
where inequality (i) uses that 3 logm > 2 logm + 1 and inequality (ii) that 2 logm > 2, in both
cases as m ≥ 3. In the other case, we let p ≥ 1/m2. Then
P(X = dle)
(iii)
≤ P(X = d3mpe)2−2 log(m)−t ≤ 2
−t
m2
≤ p2−t,
where inequality (iii) uses that P(X = k) ≤ P(X = k − 1) for k ≥ mp and again that 3 logm >
2 logm+ 1.
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D Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the theorem for a more general family of updates, which include projected stochastic
gradient as a special case, known as the aProx (approximate proximal point) family [5, 6]; several
authors present convergence analyses for these methods [21, 15, 6, 5]. These methods iteratively
build a model of the loss at the current iterate and minimize the model with regularization. A
model of ` at a point θ0, denoted `θ0(·;x), is a function satisfying the following conditions [15, 5].
(C.i) The model θ 7→ `θ0(θ;x) is convex and subdifferentiable.
(C.ii) The model is locally accuate at θ0: `θ0(θ0;x) = `(θ0;x).
(C.iii) The model provides a lower bound: `θ0(θ;x) ≤ `(θ;x) for θ ∈ Θ.
When the losses ` are convex and differentiable, the simplest model is the linear (first-order)
approximation `θ0(`;x) := `(θ0;x) + 〈∇`(θ0;x), θ − θ0〉, which satisfies conditions (C.i)–(C.iii).
For an initial point θ0 and stepsize α > 0, we define the approximate proximal point update
aprox`α(θ0;x) := argmin
θ∈Θ
{
`θ0(θ;x) +
1
2α
‖θ − θ0‖22
}
,
and gradient mapping
gα(θ0;x) :=
1
α
(
θ0 − aprox`α(θ0;x)
)
.
In standard application of such methods [21, 15, 5, 6], given a datapoint x and stepsize αk, we
update θk+1 = aprox
`
αk
(θk;x) = θk − αkgαk(θk;x). This recovers the standard projected gradient
method whenever `θ is the first-order model `θ0(θ;x) = `(θ0;x) + 〈∇`(θ0;x), θ − θ0〉 We then
perform the obvious generalization of the noisy stochastic gradient iteration (14), and we will prove
the convergence guarantee claimed in the theorem for the iteration
θnk+1 := θ
n
k − αk
(
gαk(θ
n
k ;X
n
ri(k)) + σnZk
)
. (20)
We develop a few notational shorthands for the analysis. Let
θ̂n := argmin
θ∈Θ
Ln(θ) and Hn := ∇2Ln(θ̂n) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
∇2`(θ̂n;Xi).
Then under the conditions of Assumption A1, standard asymptotics [49] give that
θ̂n
a.s.→ θ? and θ̂n − θ? = − 1
n
∇2L(θ?)−1
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?;Xi) + oP (1/
√
n). (21)
Moreover, under Assumption A1, there exists λ > 0 such if we define the event
En :=
{
‖θ̂n − θ?‖2 ≤ 
8
, ∇2Ln(θ)  λI for θ ∈ θ? + B, 1
n
n∑
i=1
La(Xi)
2 ≤ 2E[La(X)2] for a ∈ {0, 1, 2}
}
,
there exists a (potentially random, but finite N) such that n ≥ N implies En holds.
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The sequence θ
n
k defines a triangular array, which adds some complexity to our proof and
necessitates a somewhat more careful treatment, which we now provide. Our analysis follows
Polyak and Juditsky [44] and Asi and Duchi [6]. We begin by defining the triply-indexed matrices
Bki (n) := αi
k∑
j=i
j∏
l=i+1
(I − αlHn) and Aki (n) := Bki (n)−H−1n ,
where we note that H−1n exists on En and satisfies H−1n  λ−1I. Now, for sample size n, which
corresponds to running algorithm (20) at the given sample size with sample {X1, . . . , Xn}, we define
`nk(θ) = `(θ;X
n
ri(k)),
that is, the loss encountered in iteration k of the algorithm with sample size n, where ri(k) is the
random index in [n] chosen at iteration k. We let Fn = σ(X1, . . . , Xn) denote the σ-field of the n
observations, and Fnk be the σ-field generated by Xn1 and the first k random indices ri(1), . . . , ri(k).
Now we follow Asi and Duchi [6]. Let us implicitly assume the event En holds, so that all
derivatives are defined (by Assumption A1). Define the remainder
Rn(θ) := ∇Ln(θ)−Hn(θ − θ̂n)
and the localized (sub)gradient errors
ζnk :=
(
∇`nk(θnk )−∇`nk(θ̂n)
)
−
(
∇Ln(θnk )−∇Ln(θ̂n)
)
.
Finally, we consider the model subgradient errors, where we note that θnk+1 satisfies
0 ∈ ∂`θnk (θnk+1;Xnri(k)) +
1
αk
(θnk+1 − θnk ) +NΘ(θnk+1)
where NΘ(θ) = {v ∈ Rd | 〈v, τ − θ〉 ≤ 0, all τ ∈ Θ} denotes the normal cone to Θ at the point θ.
Thus, there is some vector vnk+1 ∈ NΘ(θnk+1) such that
0 ∈ ∂`θnk (θnk+1;Xnri(k)) + vnk+1 +
1
αk
(θnk+1 − θnk ) (22)
where vnk+1 = 0 if θ
n
k+1 ∈ int Θ. If θnk+1 6∈ int Θ, then [6, Lemma A.5] guarantees that
∥∥vnk+1∥∥2 ≤
2L0(X
n
ri(k)) regardless. With this, we define the model subgradient errors
εnk := ∇`θnk (θnk+1;Xnri(k)) + vnk+1 −∇`(θnk ;Xnri(k)).
With these substitutions, we have [6, Eq. (13)] that
θnk+1 − θ̂n = (I − αk)Hn(θnk − θ̂n)− αk(∇`nk(θ̂n) + σnZk)− αk (Rn(θnk ) + ζnk + εnk) .
Then following Polyak and Juditsky [44] and Asi and Duchi [6] (see Eq. (14) of the paper [6],
with a fixed negative sign), we have on the event En that
√
k∆
n
k =
1√
k
k∑
i=1
H−1n ∇`ni (θ̂n) + σnH−1n
1√
k
k∑
i=1
Zi (23)
+
1√
k
k∑
i=1
Aki (n)
(
∇`ni (θ̂n) + σnZi
)
+
1√
k
k∑
i=1
Bki (n) [Rn(θ
n
i ) + ζ
n
i + ε
n
i ] +O(1/
√
k),
where the O(1/
√
k) term is non-random on En. Moreover, supi,k,n 1{En}|||Bki (n)|||op < ∞ as
well [6, 44, Lemma 2], and independent of n, there exists  > 0 such that for all k ≥ K(),
1 {En} 1k
∑k
i=1 |||Aki (n)|||op ≤ . We control each of these quantities in turn.
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Lemma D.1. Define δk,n := ‖θnk − θ̂n‖21 {En}. Then
E[δ2k+1,n | Fn] ≤ (1− c0αk)δ2k,n + α2kE[L0(X)2] (24)
for a constant c0 > 0 that depends only on λ > 0 in the definition of En and Θ. Additionally, for
some C <∞ independent of n and k, we have
E[δ2k,n | Fn] ≤ Cαk log k.
Lemma D.2. Let Assumption A1 hold. If k(n)→∞ as n→∞, then 1√
k(n)
∑k(n)
i=1 ‖Rn(θni )‖
p→ 0.
Lemma D.3. Let Assumption A1 hold. If k(n)→∞ as n→∞, then 1√
k(n)
∑k(n)
i=1 B
k
i (n)ζ
n
i
p→ 0.
Lemma D.4. Let Assumption A1 hold. If k(n)→∞ as n→∞, then 1√
k(n)
∑k(n)
i=1 ‖εni ‖2
p→ 0.
Lemma D.5. Let Assumption A1 hold and limn σn = σ ∈ [0,∞). If k(n)→∞ as n→∞, then
1√
k(n)
k(n)∑
i=1
Aki (n)(∇`ni (θ̂n) + σnZi) p→ 0.
We prove the lemmas in Appendices D.1, D.2, D.3, D.4, D.5, respectively.
Combining the preceding three lemmas into the recursion (23), we see that if k = k(n)→∞ as
n → ∞, we use that supi,k,n 1{En}|||Bki (n)|||op < ∞ and that En occurs eventually with probability
1 to write
√
k∆
n
k =
1√
k
k∑
i=1
H−1n ∇`ni (θ̂n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:T1,n
+
1√
k
k∑
i=1
H−1n σnZi︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:T2,n
+oP (1), (25)
where the oP (1) term converges to 0 in probability as n ↑ ∞. From this point in the proof,
we will treat k as a function of n implicitly, noting that k = k(n) satisfies limn k(n)/n = γ. The
recursion (25) takes a form similar to a multiplier central limit theorem [50], allowing us to precisely
compute its asymptotics by computing the asymptotics of T1,n and T2,n, which are (asymptotically)
independent. Let Mn,i ∈ N denote the number of times observation Xi is chosen in the sampling
procedure to generate θnk after k = k(n) iterations, noting that (Mn,i)
n
i=1 ∼ Multinomial(k,1/n) is
multinomial-distributed with probabilities 1/n, and
∑n
i=1Mn,i = k. Thus we have
T1,n = 1√
k
n∑
i=1
H−1n Mn,i∇`(θ̂n;Xi).
On the event En, a Taylor expansion yields
∇`(θ̂n;Xi) = ∇`(θ?;Xi) +
(∇2`(θ?;Xi) + En,i) (θ̂n − θ?),
where |||En,i|||op ≤ L2(Xi)‖θ̂n − θ?‖2 by Assumption A1. Rearranging the count-based recursion
thus gives
T1,n = 1√
k
H−1n
n∑
i=1
Mn,i∇`(θ?;Xi) + 1√
k
H−1n
( n∑
i=1
Mn,i(∇2`(θ?;Xi) + En,i)
)
(θ̂n − θ?)
=
1√
k
H−1n
n∑
i=1
Mn,i∇`(θ?;Xi) (26)
− 1√
k
H−1n
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
Mn,i(∇2`(θ?;Xi) + En,i)
)(
∇2L(θ?)−1
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?;Xi) + oP (
√
n)
)
.
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Now, we use that E[Mn,i] = k/n and Var(Mn,i) = k/n(1 − 1/n), with Cov(Mn,i,Mn,j) = −k/n2,
independently of Xi, to obtain
1
n
∑n
i=1Mn,i(∇2`(θ?;Xi) + En,i) = kn 1n
∑n
i=1∇2`(θ?;Xi) + oP (1) =
k
nHn + oP (1), so that expansion (26) becomes
T1,n = 1√
k
H−1n
n∑
i=1
Mn,i∇`(θ?;Xi)− 1√
k
k
n
(1 + oP (1))∇2L(θ?)−1
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?;Xi) + oP (1)
=
1√
k
(∇2L(θ?) + oP (1))−1
n∑
i=1
(
Mn,i − k
n
)
∇`(θ?;Xi) +
√
k
n
oP (1) (27)
where the error oP (1)
p→ 0 as n ↑ ∞.
Substituting expression (27) into the expansion (25) and renormalizing by
√
n instead of
√
k,
√
n∆
n
k = (∇2L(θ?)+oP (1))−1
[√
n
k
· 1√
n
n∑
i=1
√
n
k
(
Mn,i − k
n
)
∇`(θ?;Xi) +
√
n
k
1√
k
σn
k∑
i=1
Zi
]
+oP (1).
Now, note that by the classic multiplier central limit theorems (cf. [50, Chapters 2.9 and 3.6]),
using that (n/k)Var(Mn,i) = 1− 1/n we have the joint convergence(
1√
n
n∑
i=1
√
k
n
(
Mn,i − k
n
)
∇`(θ?;Xi), 1√
n
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?;Xi)
)
d→N
([
0
0
]
,
[
Σ` 0
0 Σ`
])
.
Adding and subtracting
√
n(θ̂n − θ?) as in the standard asymptotic expansion (21), we have
√
n(θ
n
k − θ?) = ∇2L(θ?)−1
[√
n
k
1√
n
n∑
i=1
√
k
n
(
Mn,i − k
n
)
∇`(θ?;Xi) . . .
+
1√
n
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ?;Xi) +
√
n
k
σn√
k
k∑
i=1
Zi
]
+ oP (1)
d→N (0,∇2L(θ?)−1 ((1 + 1/γ)Σ` + (1/γ)Σzσ2)∇2L(θ?)−1) .
D.1 Proof of Lemma D.1
We have [6, Lemma 3.4] that
1
2
‖θnk+1 − θ̂n‖22 ≤
1
2
‖θnk − θ̂n‖22 − αk
[
`nk(θ
n
k )− `nk(θ̂n)
]
+
α2k
2
‖∇`nk(xnk)‖22
≤ 1
2
‖θnk − θ̂n‖22 − αk
[
`nk(θ
n
k )− `nk(θ̂n)
]
+
α2k
2
L0(X
n
ri(k))
2.
Taking expectations conditional on Fnk−1, the σ-field of the sample {Xi}ni=1 and the first k − 1
random indices ri(1), . . . , ri(k − 1), and noting that En ∈ Fn ⊂ Fnk−1, we have
1
2
1 {En}E[‖θnk+1 − θ̂n‖22 | Fnk−1] ≤ 1 {En} ·
{
1
2
‖θnk − θ̂n‖22 − αk
[
Ln(θ
n
k )− Ln(θ̂n)
]
+
n∑
i=1
α2k
2n
L0(Xi)
2
}
≤ 1 {En} ·
{
1− c0αk
2
‖θnk − θ̂n‖22 + α2kE[L0(X)2]
}
,
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where c0 > 0 is a constant depending on λ,Θ, which is positive because ∇2Ln(θ)  λI for θ near
θ?. In particular, with the definition δk,n := ‖θnk − θ̂n‖21 {En}, then integrating over the indices
ri(k) gives the result (24).
The second result follows exactly as in the proof of Lemma A.2 of the paper [6] (see specifically
inequality (17) in the arXiv technical report version).
D.2 Proof of Lemma D.2
On the event En, Ln has
√
2E[L1(X)2]-Lipschitz gradient on Θ, and so a Taylor approximation
gives that for some C <∞ independent of n and k, Rn(θ) ≤ C‖θ − θ̂n‖22. Thus
E[‖Rn(θnk )‖2 1 {En}] ≤ CE[1 {En} ‖θnk − θ̂n‖22] ≤ Cαk log k,
where we have used Lemma D.1. Thus
1√
k
k∑
i=1
E[‖Rn(θnk )‖2 1 {En}] ≤
C log k√
k
k∑
i=1
αi ≤ Ck1−β− 12 log k → 0
as k ↑ ∞. As En happens eventually, we have the result.
D.3 Proof of Lemma D.3
Fixing the sample {Xi}ni=1, the localized subgradient errors ζnk are a martingale sequence adapted
to Fnk = σ(Fn, ri(1), . . . , ri(k)), the σ-field of Fn and the random indices of the iteration through
time k. Moreover, En ∈ Fn and Bki (n) ∈ Fn for all i, k. Thus
E
[∥∥∥∥ k∑
i=1
Bki (n)ζ
n
i
∥∥∥∥2
2
| Fn
]
=
k∑
i=1
E
[
‖Bki (n)ζni ‖22 | Fn
]
.
Now, we note that if θnk , θ̂n ∈ θ? + B, then
‖ζnk ‖2 ≤
(
L1(X
n
ri(k)) +
1
n
n∑
i=1
L1(Xi)
)∥∥∥θnk − θ̂n∥∥∥
2
,
while otherwise we have
‖ζnk ‖2 ≤ 2L0(Xnri(k)) +
2
n
n∑
i=1
L0(Xi).
In either case, on the event En, the compactness of Θ guarantees that there exists some C < ∞
independent of n and k such that
1 {En} ‖ζnk ‖2 ≤ C · 1 {En}
(
L0(X
n
ri(k)) + L1(X
n
ri(k)) + E[L1(X)
2]1/2
)
‖θnk − θ̂n‖2.
In particular, as θnk ∈ Fnk−1, we obtain that
1 {En}E
[
‖ζnk ‖22 | Fnk−1
]
≤ C · 1 {En}
√
E[L0(X)2] + E[L1(X)2] ·
∥∥θnk − θ̂n∥∥22.
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As supi,k,n 1 {En}
∣∣∣∣Bki (n)∣∣∣∣op <∞, we have
1 {En}E
[∥∥∥∥ k∑
i=1
Bki (n)ζ
n
i
∥∥∥∥2
2
| Fn
]
≤ C1 {En}
√
E[L0(X)2 + L1(X)2]
k∑
i=1
E
[∥∥θni − θ̂n∥∥22 | Fn]
≤ C log k
k∑
i=1
αi,
where the final inequality uses Lemma D.1. Dividing by k gives the result.
D.4 Proof of Lemma D.4
We continue to build off of Asi and Duchi [6]. By Lemma A.4 (a specialization of [16, Thm. 6.1])
of their paper, as `(·;x) has L1(x)-Lipschitz gradient on θ? + B ⊂ int Θ, we have (see also [6,
Eq. (15)]) that whenever θnk , θ
n
k+1 ∈ θ? + (/4)B,
‖εnk‖2 ≤ 2L1(Xnri(k))‖θnk − θnk+1‖2 ≤ αkL1(Xnri(k))2 + αk ‖∇`nk(θnk )‖22 .
We also always have ‖εnk‖2 ≤ 4L0(Xnri(k)) by the triangle inequality applied to the containment (22).
Consequently, we obtain that
1√
k
k∑
i=1
‖εni ‖2 ≤
4√
k
k∑
i=1
1
{‖θni − θ?‖2 ≥ /4, ∥∥θni+1 − θ?∥∥2 ≥ /4} L0(Xnri(i))
+
1√
k
k∑
i=1
αi
(
L1(X
n
ri(i))
2 + ‖∇`ni (θni )‖22
)
.
Now, we use the triangle inequality to see that on the event En, as ‖θ̂n − θ?‖2 ≤ /8, to have∥∥θni+1 − θ?∥∥2 ≥ /4 we must have ∥∥∥θni+1 − θ̂n∥∥∥2 ≥ /8. Moreover, for this to be the case, the
Lipschitz continuity of ` over Θ and that
∥∥θni+1 − θni ∥∥2 ≤ αiL0(Xnri(i)) together give that∥∥θni+1 − θ?∥∥2 ≥ 4 implies ∥∥∥θni − θ̂n∥∥∥2 + αiL0(Xnri(i)) ≥ 8 .
Thus, revisiting the previous display, we have on En that
1√
k
k∑
i=1
‖εni ‖2 ≤
4√
k
k∑
i=1
(
2 · 1
{
‖θni − θ̂n‖2 ≥ /16
}
+ 1
{
αiL0(X
n
ri(i)) ≥ /8
})
L0(X
n
ri(i))
+
1√
k
k∑
i=1
αi
(
L1(X
n
ri(i))
2 + ‖∇`ni (θni )‖22
)
.
Taking expectations conditional on Fn and using that En ∈ Fn, we have on the event En that
E
[
1√
k
k∑
i=1
‖εni ‖2 | Fn
]
≤ 8√
k
k∑
i=1
E
[
L0(X
n
ri(i))1
{
‖θni − θ̂n‖2 ≥ /16
}
| Fn
]
+
4√
k
k∑
i=1
1
n
n∑
j=1
L0(Xj)1 {αiL0(Xj) ≥ /8}
+
4√
k
k∑
i=1
αi
(
E[L1(X)2] + E[L0(X)2]
)
, (28)
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where we have used that on En, 1n
∑n
i=1 La(Xi)
2 ≤ 2E[La(X)2] for a ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
We now control the first terms in the righthand sum of inequality (28). For the second, we note
that if Y is a random variable with E[Y 2] ≤ C, then
E[Y 1 {αY ≥ }] ≤
√
E[Y 2]P(αY ≥ ) ≤
√
α2E[Y 2]E[Y 2]/2 ≤ Cα/
by the Cauchy-Schwarz and Chebyshev inequalities, so that on event En that 1n
∑n
i=1 L0(Xi)
2 ≤
2E[L0(X)2], we have
1
n
n∑
j=1
L0(Xj)1 {αiL0(Xj) ≥ /8} ≤ 16

αi.
For the first term in the right side of (28), recalling the definition δk,n = ‖θnk − θ̂n‖21{En} in
Lemma D.1, we use that θni ∈ Fni−1 to obtain
1 {En}E
[
L0(X
n
ri(i))1
{
‖θ̂n − θni ‖2 ≥ /16
}
| Fn
]
=
1
n
n∑
j=1
L0(Xj)P (δi,n ≥ /16 | Fn)
≤ 1
n
n∑
j=1
L0(Xj)
Cαi log i
2
,
where the inequality is a consequence of Lemma D.1 and Chebyshev’s inequality. Returning to
inequality (28), we find that
1 {En}E
[
1√
k
k∑
i=1
‖εni ‖2 | Fn
]
≤ C√
k
k∑
i=1
αi log i
where C < ∞ may depend on problem parameters (e.g.  and E[La(X)2]) but is independent of k
and n. As
∑k
i=1 αi log i/
√
k = O(1)k1−β−1/2+ for any  > 0, and En occurs with probability one
eventually, taking expectations over Fn gives the lemma.
D.5 Proof of Lemma D.5
Recall that on En, if k = k(n) → ∞ then 1k
∑k
i=1 |||Aki (n)|||op → 0. As conditional on Fn we have
E[∇`ni (θ̂n) | Fn] = 1n
∑n
i=1∇`(θ̂n;Xi) = 0 on En, and the Zi are mean-zero independent of Fn with
Cov(Zi) = Σz, we have
1 {En}E
[∥∥∥∥ 1√k
k∑
i=1
Aki (n)(∇`ni (θ̂n) + σnZi)
∥∥∥∥2
2
| Fn
]
= 1 {En} 1
k
k∑
i=1
1
n
n∑
j=1
∥∥∥Aki (n)∇`(θ̂n;Xj)∥∥∥2
2
+ 1 {En} σ
2
n
k
k∑
i=1
tr(Aki (n)ΣzA
k
i (n))
≤ 1 {En} 2E[L0(X)
2]
k
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Aki (n)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
op
≤ 1 {En} σ
2
n
k
tr(Σz)
k∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣Aki (n)∣∣∣∣∣∣2
op
→ 0
as k →∞, because supi,k,n |||Aki (n)|||op1{En} <∞. That En occurs eventually gives the lemma.
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